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Perceptions of Implementation: 
Treaty Signatory Views of Treaty 
Implementation 
Jean‑Pierre Morin 
The views expressed in this communication are those of the author, and not 
necessarily those of the Government of Canada.
Introduction
Since  the  rebirth of  the  Indian Rights movement, Treaty First Nations  and  the 
Government of Canada have agreed to disagree. Both sides have radically different 
perspectives  of  the  same  issue:  the  implementation  of  the Numbered Treaties. 
On the one hand, Treaty First Nations have argued that  the Numbered Treaties 
have not been fully implemented and that the Government of Canada continues to 
refuse to honour to its treaty obligations. The Government of Canada, on the other 
hand, counters that it has substantially implemented and fulfilled its treaty obliga-
tions. For cases in which First Nations groups have maintained that treaty terms 
remain unfulfilled, the specific claims process has been created to address their 
allegations. This disagreement on the degree of implementation of the Numbered 
Treaties is a major underlying cause of conflict between Canada and Treaty First 
Nations on Numbered Treaty issues, which, in turn, is affecting the implementa-
tion of modern initiatives, programs, and agreements—not to mention increasing 
the financial and resource costs associated with them through such delays.
This  is,  however,  not  a  modern  debate.  Immediately  after  the  signing  of 
Treaties 4 and 6 in 1874 and 1876, it was clear that both parties to the treaties had 
different understandings of how the treaties would be implemented. To the Crown, 
the terms of the treaties were clearly spelled out in the text, and it was understood 
that the written terms were to be strictly adhered to. Treaty chiefs, however, argued 
that the treaty terms as described were incomplete and insufficient to help them 
cope with a changing living environment. To understand the modern Numbered 
Treaty debate, it is useful to examine the origins of the conflict—specifically, 
how the treaty signatories’ views of treaty implementation were expressed in the 
first 20 years after the treaty signings, and how these views had an impact upon 
the  relations between  the Government of Canada and First Nations peoples.  It 
was clear from the first year after the treaty signings that the Crown and Aborigi-
nal signatories did not share the same view of the treaties. While Treaty chiefs 
repeatedly called upon the Department of Indian Affairs and Ottawa to fulfill their 
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promises  through  letters  and  petitions,  the  government  steadfastly  stuck  to  its 
policy of strict adherence to the terms of the text. As hardship befell the bands 
in the northwest, they pushed for fulfilment and some even asked to renegotiate 
the treaties. Through all this, Ottawa continued to reject all complaints about the 
treaties and increased the pressure on bands to settle on reserves. A clash between 
the two was inevitable.
While it would have been useful to examine all treaty areas in the Northwest 
Territories,  such  an  expansive  study  is  not  practical  in  this  instance.  In  order 
to develop  a better,  representative understanding of  the  issues  at  hand  and  the 
evolution of the growing conflict between the Government of Canada and First 
Nations in the Northwest, two treaty regions will be used as a type of case study 
of the Northwest. The areas included in Treaties 4 and 6, covering what is now 
southern  and  central  Saskatchewan  as  well  as  central Alberta,  are  the  best  to 
represent the conflict because of the large volume of correspondence from bands 
in these areas to the Crown expressing their opinions regarding the implementa-
tion of  the  treaties. Furthermore,  the Department of  Indian Affairs  saw several 
of the chiefs in these two areas as “troublesome,” and kept substantial record of 
their opinions on  these particular  tribes and  their  claims. Finally, departmental 
officials also responded to the claims being made by the Treaty 4 and 6 chiefs, in 
which they elaborated and debated the Crown’s obligation and its fulfilment of  
treaty promises.
Treaty Signings
Shortly after the transfer of Rupert’s Land to the Dominion of Canada in 1869, 
Canada  undertook  the  negotiation  of  a  series  of  treaties  across  the Northwest 
Territories. Obligated by the terms of  the Rupert’s Land Act and the Northwest 
Territories Act, the Dominion wanted to secure the Aboriginal title to the lands 
in the Northwest so as to facilitate settlement and development of the Territories. 
Furthermore, events in the United States, such as the Indian Wars and calls for the 
annexation of the Northwest Territories, pushed Canada to quickly establish its 
authority and sovereignty over its newly acquired territories. As the Indian Wars 
raged south of the border, the Dominion was concerned that, without treaties, the 
violence would spread north and engulf the bands in Canada. Over the span of 50 
years, 11 treaties were negotiated and signed, covering northern Ontario, all of the 
Prairies, northeastern British Columbia, and the MacKenzie Valley, and involved 
territory covering some three million square kilometres.
In the case of Treaties 4 and 6, the negotiation and conclusion of the treaties 
were  only  done  after  a  considerable  number  of  requests  from  the Aboriginal 
populations of the North and South Saskatchewan rivers. After initially refusing 
to do so, the government conceded to increasing demands and appeals from the 
area’s  Aboriginal  population  and  the  Northwest  Territories  Council  and  sent 
Commissioners to negotiate Treaty 4 at Fort Qu’Appelle. Alexander Morris, the 
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lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Territories, along with David Laird, Minister 
of the Interior, and other commissioners negotiated a treaty with the Aboriginal 
peoples  throughout  the  Qu’Appelle Valley  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Canada-
United States border.1 In September 1874, after negotiations at Qu’Appelle and 
Fort Ellice, the treaty commissioners and the chiefs agreed to use the same terms 
as those in Treaty 3 with little variation (Taylor 1985, 28). 
After the geological survey team, which was exploring and mapping the Terri-
tories, and a telegraph construction crew were stopped by Aboriginal people in 
the untreated areas  in  the summer of 1875,  the Dominion government decided 
to undertake  the negotiation of Treaty 6, with Morris  heading  the  commission 
(Taylor 1985, 7). Treaty meetings were held in August and September 1876, at 
Fort Carlton, and further west at Fort Pitt on the North Saskatchewan River. While 
there was considerable dissent among the different assembled bands, Morris and 
the  other  commissioners managed  to  secure  a  treaty,  but  only  after  conceding 
some significant additions to the treaty terms (Morris 1881/1991, 176-77). These 
concessions were criticized by Ottawa, but the criticisms were allayed by Morris’ 
reassurances that it was the only deal acceptable to the chiefs.2 
While Canada’s stated goal in the treaty process was to secure its authority and 
sovereignty over  the Northwest, Aboriginal  signatories had different goals  and 
intents. It was central for  them to secure some compensation for  the inevitable 
loss of  their  land  to growing settlement, and  they needed assistance  in making 
the transition towards an agricultural lifestyle. During the negotiations for both 
Treaties 4 and 6, the chiefs called for more assistance, more food, more seed, more 
cattle,  and more  implements. The  treaties  also promised  to  avoid  any possible 
violent conflicts between the Aboriginal population and white settlers, a concern 
especially  in  light of  the Indian Wars  in  the United States. As Blair Stonechild 
states, “it was ... this sentiment for peace that the Indian leaders were receptive to 
the signing of treaties in the 1870s. Not only had Indians never been at war with 
whites in the Northwest, but they also sought to prevent such a thing from ever 
happening” (1986). For these chiefs, the treaties created a relationship between 
the Northwest’s Aboriginal population and Canada that ensured not only peace in 
the Territories, but also the survival of the area’s original inhabitants.
Initial Reaction to Treaty Terms and 
Implementation
As the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs settled into the administra-
tion of Ottawa’s policies and the fulfilment of the Crown’s treaty obligations, 
problems with the treaties were becoming apparent. At both signings, a signifi-
cant number of bands were absent. It has been estimated that, during the nego-
tiations  at Qu’Appelle  in 1874, nearly half of  the Aboriginal population either 
was  not  present  at  the  signing  or  refused  to  sign  at  that  time. These  included 
some of the most influential chiefs, such as Piapot. In his historical study of the  
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implementation of Treaty 4, Raoul McKay reports that most of the Assiniboine 
bands  between  the Cypress  and  the Touchwood Hills  refused  to  adhere  to  the 
treaty (McKay 1973, 41). Morris himself, in his report of the treaty negotiations, 
recognized that not all the bands were present at the signing of the treaty. At his 
stop at Fort Ellice, Morris added to the number of adherents when he convinced 
two Saulteaux chiefs also to sign the treaty (124). Even with this second signing 
of 1874, there were still some 600 to 700 Crees, Saulteaux, and Assiniboine who 
had not yet signed. 
A similar situation existed during the negotiations for Treaty 6, during which 
several  prominent  chiefs  were  absent  during  the  Fort  Pitt  negotiations. When 
Morris  and  the  Treaty  Commission  arrived,  some  one  hundred  lodges  were 
gathered  to meet  them. A  large  number  of  Cree  and  Saulteaux were  out  on  a 
hunt,  as  a  herd  of  buffalo  had  been  spotted  in  the  vicinity  (Taylor  1985,  23). 
While messengers were sent out to fetch some chiefs, such as Sweet Grass, others 
were ignored or forgotten. Two such prominent chiefs were Big Bear and Little 
Pine, who controlled some 85 lodges between them (Dempsey, 1984, 71). Morris 
believed  that Sweet Grass was  the principal chief of  the district and  that, with 
his  presence,  there was  no  need  to wait  for  the  other  chiefs  to  arrive  (Morris 
1881/1991, 179). This decision would have dire consequences for  the relations 
between the Treaty 6 bands and the Crown.
The absence of a large number of bands at the 1874 signing of Treaty 4 became a 
serious issue during the first treaty annuity payment. Two members of the original 
treaty  commission,  W.J.  Christie  and  M.G.  Dickieson,  arrived  at  Fort  Ellice 
in 1875 to find twice the number lodges that had been present a year previous. A 
council had been held prior to the arrival of the government officials, and Christie 
and Dickieson were surprised to discover that the assembled bands wanted new 
terms  for  the  treaty.  In  his  report  to David Laird, Minister  of  the  Interior  and 
Treaty  4 Commissioner, Christie warned  the  chiefs  that  a  refusal  of  the  terms 
of the 1874 treaty would result in a report to the government that the chiefs had 
“broken the agreement.” In her study of the agricultural policies of the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs in the Northwest, Sarah Carter states that “officials saw 
the treaty as a ‘covenant’ between the Indians and the Government; therefore it 
was impossible to comply with new demands” (Carter 1990, 74). While Christie 
agreed to hear the chiefs’ demands and report them back to Ottawa, Christie and 
Dickieson did not include the demands in the official report of the adhesion and 
annuity payment. Rather, they included them in a separate letter to Laird. In their 
letter, the commissioners indicated that they explained the main premises of the 
treaty  to  the bands,  that all bands be  treated equally. They also had stressed  to 
the assembled bands  that  the original agreement should be respected. For  their 
part,  the assembled First Nations had made  three demands: more money, more 
implements,  and more assistance. The annuity  set  in Treaty 4 was  regarded as 
insufficient, and the chiefs asked for the annuity to be increased from $5 to $12 a 
person. They also requested an increase in the amount spent on ammunition and 
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twine from $750 for the entire treaty area to $250 per year per band. In regard 
to  agricultural  implements,  they  demanded  a  blacksmith  and  a  forge, mowers, 
and mills for every reserve, as well as the implements offered in 1874. The most 
important demands they made dealt with assistance to the bands. The chiefs recog-
nized that they needed assistance to make the transition to agriculture. They asked 
for more rations, medicines, and someone to teach them how to farm and build 
houses.3 In reply to these demands by both Treaty and non-Treaty bands, Christie 
and Dickieson stated that none of these concerns and demands had been brought 
up  at  the Qu’Appelle  signing  in  1874. They  followed  up  by  saying  that  these 
demands could not be considered rights, but if they were fulfilled they would only 
be considered “favours.” Dickieson and Christie reported that they had made it 
clear to the chiefs that they did not believe that these demands would be granted: 
“At the same time, we held out no hope that any would be granted except that a 
man might be sent possibly to shew them how to use their tools.”4 
Christie and Dickieson’s reaction to the chiefs’ demands for a renegotiation of 
treaty terms was typical of the position that the Department of Indian Affairs held 
regarding calls for new terms for the treaties.   Over the next 10 years, all calls 
for new treaties or terms were answered in the same way: The treaty terms were 
established at the time of signing and those terms could not be changed. Not only 
could the terms not be changed, the exact wording of the text had to be strictly 
followed. The federal government had intended the Numbered Treaties to be their 
main  tool  for  securing Canada’s  interests  to  the  lands  of  the Northwest  at  the 
lowest possible cost (Dyck 1986, 122). Treaty commissioners and the officers of 
the Department of Indian Affairs saw the treaties as once and for all agreements 
to exchange Aboriginal interests to the Crown for benefits. The interpretation of 
the terms, in the eyes of the government, was under no circumstances to be left to 
the Aboriginal signatories. As no provisions in the treaties allowed for any type of 
arbitration in the case of disagreement, the department maintained that its inter-
pretation of the written text was the most accurate (McKay 1972, 39). Ottawa also 
believed itself to be in a position of strength, both legally and morally, compared 
to the bands. Indian policy in the late nineteenth century was largely guided by 
the civilization projects of the department, and officials, politicians, and the public 
at large maintained that it was their responsibility to bring the Indian towards the 
more “civilized,” British Victorian way of  life. Furthermore,  the treaties bound 
the Treaty bands to the law of Canada, as well as binding them to fulfilling their 
half of  the  treaty promises—“yielding, ceding and surrendering”  their  interests 
and title to the land (39). But while the government had a legal system to enforce 
Aboriginal fulfilment of the treaty terms, there was no such mechanism to enforce 
a mutually acceptable interpretation of the Crown’s obligations.
As  demonstrated  by  the  1875  requests  for  renegotiation  of  the  terms  of 
Treaty 4, the fulfilment of the clauses regarding agricultural implements and 
assistance was one of  the central grievances of Treaty bands. As several histo-
rians  have  shown,  the Crown was  not willing  to  commit  fully  to  the  lifestyle 
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transformation of the Plains Indians, regardless of its own rhetoric. The Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs was not prepared to undertake the logistics of establishing 
an administrative infrastructure or providing practical assistance to bands attempt-
ing to farm (Dyck, 1986 125). In addition to the logistical nightmare of transfer-
ring some 60,000 people  from a nomadic  to a  settled agricultural  lifestyle,  the 
department was hampered by constant financial shortfalls and budgetary restric-
tions. As McKay’s study of the implementation of Treaty 4 suggests, the terms of 
the treaties themselves did not allow for sufficient funds or rations to allow bands 
to gain a foothold in their new lives as agriculturalists (McKay 1972, 131).
The terms of the treaties were to be followed exactly and precisely. This strict 
adherence  to  the  text not only  limited  the extent of  the Crown’s  treaty obliga-
tions, but was also fiscally prudent for the government. In both Treaties 4 and 6, 
the agricultural benefits were only to be issued to bands that had first settled on a 
reserve and broken the ground. Treaty 4 states that “It is further agreed between 
Her Majesty and the said Indians that the following articles shall be supplied to 
any band thereof who are now actually cultivating the soil, or who shall hereafter 
settle on  their  reserves and commence  to break up  the  land.”5 To departmental 
officials, both this clause and the similar one in Treaty 6 limited the Crown’s 
responsibility  for  issuing  implements  and  cattle  only  to  those  bands  that were 
settled on a reserve and who had already broken up soil prior to receiving imple-
ments, although this does lead to the question of how the agricultural implements 
clauses of the treaties would assist the bands to adopt agriculture if implements 
were only issued to bands already engaged in farming. Furthermore, departmental 
officials stated that implements were not to become the property of the bands or 
chiefs. Rather, the tools, and even the cattle, remained the property of the govern-
ment and any damage to them could be judged as vandalism of Crown property. 
Departmental officials were reluctant to replace damaged tools because of the 
cost, but also because some believed that it would serve little purpose to do so.
At  the  time  of  the  implementation  of  the  treaties,  an  economic  slowdown 
was  having  a  serious  impact  upon  the  business  of  the  Canadian  government. 
The worldwide recession, later a depression, lasted some 20 years, and severely 
reduced  the  federal  government’s  revenues, which were  based on  excise  taxes 
and  duties. At  the  same  time,  a  new  deputy  superintendent  general  of  Indian 
Affairs was taking charge, centralizing decision making and changing the admin-
istration  of  the  department. Lawrence Vankoughnet,  a  high-ranking Tory  from 
Cornwall, Ontario and a  long-time supporter of Sir  John A. Macdonald, was a 
micro-manager of  the highest order. Vankoughnet centralized all decisions  into 
his own hands and removed nearly all the discretionary powers of Indian agents, 
including those of the Indian commissioner in the Northwest (Carter 1990, 51). 
He seldom took the advice of men in the field and relied almost entirely upon 
his own opinions. Vankoughnet was also renowned for his frugality and efforts 
to minimize costs; his efforts created a slow and largely inefficient administra-
tion.6 Vankoughnet’s administration made no distinction between the funds spent 
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for treaty implementation and those spent for general assistance to bands, such 
as the issuing of rations. To him, all were expenses that needed to be cut. After 
his  1881  tour  of  the Northwest,  during which  he met with  several  chiefs  and 
visited reserves, Vankoughnet dramatically cut $140,000 from the departmental 
budget, dismissed clerks and agents, and ordered the reduction of rations (Demp- 
sey 1984, 121). 
The deputy superintendent also was interested in reducing costs. Laird’s replace-
ment (as of 1876) as minister of the Interior and ex officio superintendent general 
of Indian Affairs was David Mills, who believed that more than enough had been 
done in the few years since the signing of the treaties to encourage the transition 
of First Nations people to agriculture. He also held the notion that, during Laird’s 
ministry, the government had been far too generous in issuing implements, tools, 
and  cattle  (Carter  1990,  69). With  the  goal  of  reducing  costs,  the  department 
was  to  limit  the  distribution  of  tools  and  implements. Along  with Vankough-
net and Mills, other officials in Ottawa had begun to develop, along with their 
desire to cut spending, a view that Canada was being too generous towards the 
Treaty bands, and that such “charity” was detrimental to the civilization of Abor- 
iginal people.
While  it  is  true  to  state  that  the Department of  Indian Affairs was  spending 
far more than was required by the terms of the treaties for rations, implements, 
and cattle, these expenditures were still insufficient to permit a proper transi-
tion from hunting to farming. Reports of bands killing their cattle for food were 
frequent, as were accounts of individuals begging at the doors of white settlers. 
These incidents did not lead departmental officials to recognize problems with the 
agricultural policy or the insufficiency of the rations being issued. Instead, politi-
cians and bureaucrats saw these incidents as examples of laziness, or a refusal to 
become self-sufficient. This opinion was widespread throughout Indian Affairs. In 
a letter to Alexander Morris in 1873, Edward McKay stressed that the transition 
to an agricultural way of life would not be easy for the Plains people: “The Plains 
Indians accustomed  to an easy,  free,  and  lazy existence will not  in  the present 
generation take to farming unless compelled to do so.”7 
By the end of the 1870s, the belief that treaty bands had no desire to make the 
transition to agriculture because they preferred to live by government handouts was 
the dominant view of officials, and this opinion coloured all subsequent relations 
with First Nations. With the desired goal of compelling Aboriginal people to adopt 
farming, in concordance with the government’s underlying goal of civilizing the 
Treaty bands, and influenced by the Victorian belief that charity leads to laziness, 
the Department of Indian Affairs adopted a ration policy of “food for work.” The 
issuance of rations became directly tied to the work Aboriginal bands undertook, 
and their adoption of agriculture, treaty benefits, and government assistance were 
rolled into the central issue of rations.   Rations were issued to individuals who 
were working on their reserves, for their agents, or, after the creation of instruc-
tional farms, for the farm instructors. Agents were instructed to feed only those 
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who were willing to work and to criticize openly those who did not (McKay 1972, 
114). The issuance of rations was not only used to encourage farming. On several 
occasions, officials such as Indian commissioner, Edgar Dewdney, used the 
issuance of rations as tool for Aboriginal compliance. When trying to get bands 
to stay on their reserves, Dewdney ordered that rations were only to be issued on 
a band’s respective reserve.8 The department’s rations policy quickly became a 
major complaint for Treaty bands.
The government’s interpretation of the treaty terms, and the desire to reduce 
expenditures as well as the growing administrative structure of the department, 
had a severe impact on its ongoing relationship with Treaty chiefs. In her paper 
“Magnificent Gifts,” Jean Friesen explains that “to the Indians, disillusioned 
with the government’s unilateral interpretation, increasingly confined in their 
economic opportunities, and ruled by  the federal Indian Act  to which  they had 
never  consented,  the  treaties  came  to be  seen  in  the words of  a Saskatchewan 
chief as merely ‘sweet promises’ ” (Friesen 1999, 212). Only a few years after 
the signing of the treaties, chiefs were beginning to believe that the treaties had 
serious shortcomings and that the Indian Affairs department did not see the treaties 
in the same way as they did. Because the buffalo disappeared much more quickly 
than anyone had expected—the conservative estimates at the time had been 10 or 
more years before their total disappearance—Aboriginal populations lost not only 
their main food staple but also their main economic staple within five years of the 
signing the  treaties (McKay 1972, 110). While Morris and Laird had promised 
that the treaties would allow the bands to prosper and adapt to the new realities of 
the Northwest, in reality the Aboriginal population had begun a steady economic 
and social regression from their pre-treaty lives.
The annual treaty annuity payments, which were made at a gathering of bands 
on the site of the treaty negotiations until 1879, were a popular occasion for chiefs 
to express their dissatisfaction with government policy and treaty implementation. 
At the first treaty payment after the signing of Treaty 6 at Fort Carlton, complaints 
and concerns about the treaty culminated in the drafting of a petition that stated 
that the government had broken the treaty because of its non-fulfilment of the 
terms. The petition further called upon the governor general to reopen the nego-
tiations so as to make it more generous towards the bands.9 This incident created 
much concern for the Indian agent, Captain James Walker, who was completely 
taken aback by the complaints. Walker, who had been at Carlton but returned to 
Battleford,  attributed  the  reason  for  the  petition  upon  the  late  arrival  of  treaty 
goods and provisions to Fort Carlton. He reported to G.M. Dickieson that all the 
assembled  chiefs  had  signed  the  petition  and  already  sent  it  to Ottawa.10 This 
petition  referred  to  the  treaty  of  1876  as  nothing  but  “sweet  promises”  to  the 
bands so that they would surrender their lands. In an effort to resolve the situation, 
Walker called a council of the chiefs and explained why the presents had not been 
distributed at the time of the payments. Through the influence of Mistowasis and 
Ah-kha-ta-koop,  two chiefs who had  led  the campaign  for  the adhesion of  the 
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bands to the treaty in 1876, Walker was able to convince the chiefs to rescinded 
their petition, and sign a letter of apology. The letter stated: 
We  the  undersigned  chiefs  of  the Cree Nation who  signed  the Treaty  that was made 
at Carlton  last  summer wish you  to express  to our Good Father,  the Governor of  this 
Country our entire, and complete content and satisfaction with the terms and conditions 
of  that  treaty;  and  to  thank our  good Mother  the Queen  in  our  own manners,  for  the 
governors way in which she has fulfilled the promises they made to us ... We want also 
to tell you that we are well pleased with the way in which you have dealt with us, for the 
patience you have borne with our many questions and the kindness you have shown in 
explaining the articles of the Treaty that we do not quite understand.11
There are two remarkable points that must be noted regarding this incident. First 
the bands, when confronted by Walker, acquiesced to the demands of the depart-
mental official and apologized for their actions. In the early years of the treaty, 
chiefs were quick to rescind their earlier demands when confronted and asked for 
specifics. Another point of interest is in the last sentence of the letter signed by 
the chiefs. In it, the chiefs say that they were thankful for the agent’s explanation 
of the treaty terms. By doing so, they not only admitted that their interpretation of 
the terms was different to that of the Department of Indian Affairs, but that they 
may not have fully understood the treaty terms or, at the very least, not understood 
the government’s interpretation of the terms. This would not be the last reference 
of this nature.
In  the  following  year,  1878,  another  incident  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
department. Chief Pasqua, an original signatory to Treaty 4 in 1874 and a leader 
in the call for Aboriginal people to make the transition to agriculture, travelled to 
Winnipeg to meet with Lieutenant-Governor Cauchon. In the account drafted by 
Cauchon’s  interpreter, Pasqua presented  a  series of  complaints  about  the  inad-
equacies of the treaties. Seeing the lieutenant-governor as a more direct represen-
tative of the Queen than the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs, Pasqua 
asked that Cauchon call upon the Queen to rectify the inadequacies of the treaties. 
The report stated that the chief believed that the department was not fulfilling its 
promises even though his band had cleared 30 acres of land for planting, adding 
that “they were neither supplied with cattle to break and work the land; seed to sow 
it; nor provisions to feed them while at work.”12 Pasqua also stated that specific 
promises, made by Laird, to be supplied with rations were not being carried out 
and that his people were starving and forced to eat their dogs while at work. He 
closed his meeting with Cauchon by stating that he had come to Winnipeg as a 
sign of his friendship with the representative of the Queen, but that the Indians 
were “subject at time to an irritation of feeling against the white race who while 
establishing themselves in comfort on their broad domain have directly or indi-
rectly caused such havoc in the Northwest and that without assistance there was 
nothing left for them to do but suffer and die.”13
When Cauchon’s office forwarded a report to the Department of Indian Affairs, 
Laird was quick to refute Pasqua’s claims and question the value of his character. 
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While sources prior to this incident cited Pasqua as an industrious and valuable 
leader amongst  the Cree who had already adopted  farming prior  to  the Treaty, 
Laird dismissed his complaints as baseless and stated  that Pasqua “is  the most 
untruthful chief whom I have met in this Superintendency and though not really 
so poor as many others, he is a great beggar.”14 In regard to Pasqua’s statement 
that he had made promises to feed the bands during planting, Laird refuted the 
claim  and  returned  to  the  letter  of  the  text  of  the  treaty,  stating  that  “there  is 
no  stipulation  to  that  effect  in Treaty no.  4.”15 Because Laird  refuted Pasqua’s 
claims,  the  department  saw  no  need  to  address  the  claims  and  ignored  them. 
Pasqua, however, was no longer considered a good chief, but rather as a trouble-
some one, a typical conclusion made by the department towards any chief who 
dared complain.
David  Laird’s  dismissal  of  Pasqua’s  complaints  as  frivolous  and  exagger-
ated was typical of the “outside service,” the Indian agents scattered across the 
Territories, and of the department. In late 1877, the Indian Department in Ottawa 
sent a circular to all agents in Manitoba and the Northwest from the superinten-
dent  general  of  Indian Affairs. The  circular  asked  that  reports  of  the  status  of 
Indian  affairs  by  agency  be  sent  to Ottawa. One  question  in  particular  related 
to the implementation of treaties: “Are the Indians satisfied with the manner in 
which the treaty are [sic] being carried out; if not, what are the grounds of their 
dissatisfaction?”16 On the whole, the agents stated that the bands in their agencies 
were largely satisfied with the implementation of the treaties and that there 
were but  a  few complaints  regarding  the quantity of  stock animals  and  imple-
ments due  to  them.17 David Laird, as the highest ranking departmental official, 
rejected any possibility of complaints: “The Indians of this superintendency [the 
entire Northwest Territories] have no reason to be dissatisfied with the manner 
treaty obligations are carried out.”18 He further stated that the only complaint he 
received pertained to the quantity of provisions being distributed at the time of 
treaty payments. As there was no provision to issue rations at the treaty payments 
in the treaties, this could not be considered a complaint about the fulfilment of the 
treaty terms. Laird added that the issuance of rations was “a necessity forced upon 
the Government in order to enable the Indians from the Plains to subsist while 
away from their hunting grounds,” and he saw such complaints as unreasonable 
considering the massive government expenditure. 
Without a single agent reporting any general dissatisfaction among the bands 
and Laird’s categorical rejection of complaints, one must question the purpose of 
the reports in light of Pasqua’s meeting and the 1877 petition of the Carlton chiefs. 
As  the  Indian Affairs department was also using  these  reports as a measure of 
the agents’ management of their agencies, agents themselves appear to downplay 
the  complaints made  by  bands.  In  several  instances,  the  agents  stated  that  the 
bands were satisfied, but had a few minor complaints and proceeded to list several 
specific complaints dealing with the fulfilment of promises for stock animals and 
implements.19 Agents  replied  that  the  bands were  asking more  than  the  treaty 
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entitled them to receive. Any possible complaints were explained away not as any 
mismanagement on the part of the agent, but rather as excessive and unreasonable 
demands by the bands.
Indian Activism and Government Refusals
The reports of departmental officials are, thankfully, not the only source of infor-
mation regarding complaints of treaty non-fulfilment made by bands. Chiefs 
were quick  to use  the available resources at  their disposal  to press  the govern-
ment to look into their complaints. The letters, petitions, and delegations were so 
numerous as to lead government officials to view Aboriginal peoples as chronic 
complainers. While it is impossible to review every single complaint made, two 
occasions merit special review: the interview of chiefs by the governor general, 
the Marquis of Lorne, in 1881, and the letter to the prime minister printed in the 
Edmonton Bulletin in 1883.
As part of his general tour of Western Canada, the Marquis of Lorne travelled 
throughout the Territories and large-scale meetings with chiefs were held in the 
different treaty areas. For the Aboriginal population, the news of the coming of the 
governor general was seen as an occasion for a grand council where their concerns 
could be expressed to the direct representative of the Queen. In a society so closely 
linked by family relations, the fact that the Marquis was also the Queen’s son-in-
law signified to the assembled chiefs the importance of his status and influence. 
During  his  tour,  Lorne  held  meetings  with  the  chiefs  at  Qu’Appelle  in  the 
Treaty 4 area and at Fort Carlton  in  the Treaty 6 region. Not fully understand-
ing the somewhat symbolic role of the governor general, the chiefs of Treaties 4 
and 6 believed that the Marquis of Lorne could undertake steps to address their 
grievances.  Over  the  course  of  the  two  meetings,  the  governor  general  was 
addressed by numerous and influential chiefs and headmen. 
At both meetings, the chiefs presented three specific arguments: the insuffi-
ciency of the treaty terms, the need to renegotiate, and the need for more assis-
tance. At Qu’Appelle, Chief Kanasis told Lorne that they could not “make [their] 
living by what was given to [them] by the Treaty.”20 This sentiment was repeated 
by Yellow Quill and Louis O’Soup. The chiefs explained that their people were 
without horses because they had been forced to eat them, and that they did not 
know how to farm because no one had taught them how to use their tools. Yellow 
Quill’s statements regarding the nature of the treaties are a good representation 
of the other chiefs’ comments. He openly stated that he did “not understand the 
Treaty” and that a new treaty was necessary because “we cannot live by the first 
treaty: we shall die off ... They [the government] cannot hold the treaty that was 
made before.”21 The chiefs called upon the governor general to reopen the treaties 
and negotiate more generous  terms  for  the Aboriginal  signatories. Chiefs  such 
as Poundmaker, the influential Cree leader from the Battleford district, recalled 
Alexander Morris’s words at the treaty negotiations in 1876 when it was stated that 
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the Indian would live like the white man. Poundmaker told Lorne that the treaty 
terms did not permit him to live like the white settlers and that better tools and 
implements, similar to those used by the settlers, should be provided to him.22 
 In response to these constant calls for a new treaty and more assistance, the 
Marquis de Lorne responded in a manner typical of the federal government and 
white society as a whole. Lorne saw the bands as lazy and idle with no real desire 
to adapt to the new reality of the Northwest (Carter 1990, 144). Lorne stressed 
that  the treaties had brought peace to  the Territories and that  it was because of 
the benevolence of the Queen that such a thing was possible. He also underlined 
the fact that the chiefs had already signed a treaty and that such agreements must 
be respected. He reminded them that the Queen would respect her promises and 
that the “red men” must do the same. He also expressed some displeasure at the 
constant calls for a new treaty and said, “I hope to hear nothing more of breaking 
treaty for the treaty was made for them and their children’s good. And no good 
man among them need fear that he will not be as well off as the white man.”23 
The chiefs came away from their council with the governor general with nothing 
more than a few presents and statements that the treaties must be maintained as 
they were negotiated. Their experience with the Queen’s son-in-law proved to be 
similar to every other meeting with government officials.
The  other  incident  that  garnered  considerable  attention  was  a  letter  to  the 
prime minister  that appeared  in  the Edmonton Bulletin. Signed by nine chiefs, 
including all of the chiefs of the Hobbema agency south of Edmonton, the letter 
is a striking complaint of their treatment since signing Treaty 6. The chiefs argued 
that the treaty was only favourable for the federal government—“the white man 
had it all his own way. He made the conditions both for himself and for us”—and 
that the Department of Indian Affairs treated the bands like groups of children. 
They stressed that, at the signing, the treaty was said to be inviolable and binding 
upon both parties, but that only the Indian was required to follow the treaty while 
the federal government did what it wished and ignored its promises and obliga-
tions. As did  the  chiefs who met with  the governor general,  the  letter  referred 
to the promises made by the Treaty commissioners that the treaties would help 
the Indians survive and prosper. Since the treaty, the bands had become poverty-
stricken  and  starving,  and  the  chiefs  feared  that  their  people would  eventually 
disappear from the Plains. They closed by warning that their complaints should be 
addressed or they “shall conclude that the treaty made with us six years ago was 
meaningless matter of form and that the white man had indirectly doomed us to 
annihilation, little by little.”24 
Despite  the  chiefs’  warnings,  the  department  paid  little  heed  to  the  letters’ 
complaints  and accusations. Rather, Lawrence Vankoughnet,  the deputy  super-
intendent general, and Edgar Dewdney, the Indian commissioner, spent the next 
several months trying to find whom had written the letter for the chiefs. When 
Father  C.  Scollen,  a  Catholic missionary  in  the  Edmonton  district  and  a man 
highly critical of the Indian department, was finally identified, they accused him 
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of acting in a treasonous manner and of causing great harm to the bands by raising 
their  expectations and spreading  lies.25 The archival files of the Department of 
Indian Affairs  contain  a  copy of  the original  letter  printed  in  the Bulletin,  and 
some 20 pages worth of  correspondence  relating  to  the department’s  efforts  at 
identifying  Scollen,  but  not  a  single  document  disputes  or  even  addresses  the 
complaints presented in the letter.
As  letters,  petitions,  and  delegations  proved  to  be  largely  ineffectual,  other 
chiefs chose different routes in attempts to enforce the fulfilment of treaty terms. 
Poundmaker, Piapot, and Big Bear, all very influential and powerful chiefs in 
their own right, each chose a different tactic: Poundmaker refused to work; Piapot 
refused to take a reserve; and Big Bear refused to take treaty. Each had his own 
reasons for discontent. During the Fort Carlton negotiations, Poundmaker, at the 
time a headman and not a chief, openly opposed the treaty and demanded that the 
chiefs wait for better terms. In the years after the treaty, he routinely challenged 
the authority of Indian agents and demanded more implements and more sophis-
ticated  machinery,  all  the  while  demanding  rations  for  his  band  (Department 
of  Indian Affairs, 1882, 195). Piapot, while not present  at  the 1874  signing of 
Treaty 4, was one of the leading chiefs who demanded that the treaty be modified 
during  the  1875  treaty  payment  at  Qu’Appelle.  As  with  many  chiefs  in  the 
Treaty 4 area, Piapot wanted his  reserve  to be  in  the Cypress Hills,  a  location 
rejected by the department (Morin 2003). Told to take a reserve near Indian Head, 
Piapot refused to select a specific site until 1882, when the department agreed to 
his selection and provided rations and transportation to the reserve.26 As for Big 
Bear, his band’s hunting expedition cost him the chance to speak at the Fort Pitt 
negotiations for Treaty 6, and he staunchly believed the treaty terms to be meagre 
and insufficient to meet the needs of the Plains people. Big Bear continually 
refused to sign the treaty and travelled across the Prairie in search of buffalo, often 
crossing into Montana. He met with various chiefs and Aboriginal leaders trying 
to garner support for a renegotiation of the treaties (Dempsey 1984, 122). Only 
after starvation and desertions to other bands had severely reduced the number of 
his followers did Big Bear take treaty at Fort Walsh in 1882.
Of the three chiefs, Big Bear was considered by far the most influential and 
potentially dangerous leader on the Prairie. As has already been stated, Big Bear 
had one of  the  largest  followings  among  the Plains Cree  in  the Treaty  6  area, 
and was well  respected as a wise man not only for his council but also for his 
medicine. While  starvation  forced  him  to  adhere  to  the  treaty,  Big  Bear  was 
still determined to continue to press the Department of Indian Affairs for better 
treaty terms. Refusing to take a reserve, or by asking for land that he knew would 
be rejected by officials, he travelled across the region, calling upon the other 
chiefs  to  stand  united with  him  against  the  federal  government. By  1884, Big 
Bear had considerable support from among the different bands. In his report to 
Edgar Dewdney about Big Bear calling upon the department to fulfil the treaties, 
Agent  J.A. McRae  stated  that  “a  year  ago,  [Big Bear]  stood  alone,  in making 
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these demands; now, the whole of the Indians are with him.”27 Big Bear encour-
aged other chiefs  to stand  together when confronting agents and other govern-
ment officials, a tactic adopted by Louis O’Soup in the Treaty 4 area.28 For his 
refusal to take treaty and a reserve, as well as his constant meetings with chiefs, 
the higher-ranking officers of the department viewed Big Bear with considerable 
suspicion. Hayter Reed, one-time Indian agent and assistant Indian commissioner 
for the Northwest, described Big Bear as “an agitator and always has been and 
having  received  the moral  support of  the half-breed community he  is only  too 
glad to have the opportunity of inciting the Indians to make fresh and exorbitant 
demands.”29 Every statement and meeting Big Bear made was closely monitored 
by the department. While Big Bear was getting the attention that he wanted,  it 
was for the entirely wrong reasons. The Department of Indian Affairs continued 
to dismiss his claims as gross exaggerations of the treaty terms and his actions 
as nothing more than troublesome behaviour. The officials of the Department of 
Indian Affairs continued to be blind to any link between the claims and complaints 
being made and their own implementation of the treaties.
The  general  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  department’s  policies  and 
practices,  and  Big  Bear’s  efforts  to  unite  the  bands  across  the  Northwest, 
coalesced  in 1883 and 1884  in a series of councils. Sponsored by some of  the 
chiefs considered by Dewdney and Reed to be the most troublesome, the depart-
ment looked upon these gatherings with suspicion. The focus of these councils, 
which also included the traditional thirst or sun dance, was to decide how best to 
deal with the federal government’s non-fulfilment of the treaties and what tactic 
should be employed to negotiate new agreements with the Crown. Piapot and Big 
Bear were, again, central figures in this latest attempt to organize the bands. As 
both chiefs were of the same mind regarding the need to stand united against the 
federal government, Piapot and Big Bear wanted the councils  to give them the 
authority to represent the other chiefs and present their grievances and complaints 
to Dewdney and Macdonald. In Piapot’s case, a council and dance was held on 
his  reserve  in  the  fall of 1883 with attendance by most of  the Treaty 4 chiefs. 
During the meetings, Piapot had little difficulty convincing the others to change 
their stance towards the government officials. Recognizing the need for wider 
representation, the council concluded with a call to hold a grand council of the 
Northwest where representatives from the Cree, Assiniboine, and Blackfoot bands 
would attend to plan an appropriate strategy to deal with the federal government 
in a united manner (Dempsey 1984, 123). 
As  messengers  travelled  between  reserves  calling  the  bands  together,  the 
Department of Indian Affairs, thinking that these councils were the prelude to a 
violent uprising, began to flex its muscles in response. Senior officials were also 
very much aware of the purpose of the councils. In March 1884, J.M. Rae, Indian 
agent for the Carlton district, stated in a letter to Edgar Dewdney that “messen-
gers are being sent all over the Country and that the chiefs all over the Country 
are to join those B/ford rascals next summer in asking for better terms.”30 As Rae 
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notes, the chiefs’ dissatisfaction with the treaty terms was well known. Because 
the department saw the terms of the treaties as fixed and non-negotiable, officials 
perceived these councils as fomenting dissent and, therefore, to be prevented. Rae 
gave a clear representation of the Crown’s position in his same letter to the Indian 
commissioner:
A firm stand must be taken and the answer no given  to all  their demands,  for  if  they 
succeed  this  time, years will not undo  the work of one day. At  the present  they  think 
they can do anything they like—and they must be disabused of this idea even by force if 
necessary—the Chiefs from below here will take and active part in the matter unless they 
see what a grave turn affairs are taking here. [emphasis in original]31
As  there were a  relatively small number of North West Mounted Police  in  the 
Territories, agents had few coercive powers. The only true method of influence at 
Indian agents’ disposal was the refusal of rations. When a chief came to ask for 
rations for the trip to a council in 1884, Indian Agent Rae was quick to refuse the 
request, stating that the federal government disapproved of the council meeting, 
while trying to dissuade the chief from attending.32
The  councils  were,  on  the  whole,  very  well  attended.  The  biggest  council 
of 1884 was hosted by Big Bear and Poundmaker, on Poundmaker’s reserve near 
Battleford. These meetings of  the chiefs proved  to be constructive and accom-
plished Big Bear’s goal of unifying the bands. The final outcome of the council 
was instruction for a delegation led by Big Bear to travel first to see Piapot in 
Treaty 4, then to Dewdney in Regina, and finally onward to Ottawa to meet with 
Vankoughnet. Their goal was to express the concerns and desires of the chiefs to 
the highest possible officials; specifically, to the superintendent general of Indian 
Affairs, Sir John A. Macdonald (Dempsey 1984, 123). Any possible success the 
proposed delegation might have had, however, was ruined before the council was 
concluded. During the council, a farm instructor named Craig was assaulted by 
a small group from the Yellow Quill band, who stopped by his house asking for 
provisions. When Craig  refused,  he was  struck  by  one  of  the men  and  subse-
quently  lodged  a  complaint with  the  nearby North West Mounted Police  post. 
When the constables arrived at the council to arrest the man in question, a large 
confrontation occurred and violence was only averted by the intervention of Big 
Bear and Poundmaker and the voluntary surrender of the suspect by the council to 
the NWMP a few days later.33 This incident completely overshadowed the rest of 
the council and dance. The near outbreak of violence put the Department of Indian 
Affairs and the NWMP on the defensive. Dewdney was no longer willing to meet 
with any delegations, and all the blame for the incident was placed on Big Bear 
and Poundmaker for having organized the council in the first place. The incident, 
however,  led  to  a  review  of  the  department’s  policy  regarding  rations  and  the 
discretionary powers of agents.
With a growing number of incidents between departmental officials and Indians 
occurring  across  the  Northwest,  Dewdney,  Hayter  Reed,  and  Deputy  Super-
intendent General Lawrence Vankoughnet began to focus  their attention on the 
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influence of specific chiefs as being at the root of the problems. Reed, the assistant 
Indian  commissioner, was  an  ever-increasing  presence  in  Indian Affairs. After 
Dewdney’s assumption of the role of lieutenant governor of the Northwest Terri-
tories, Reed took on an ever-growing amount of responsibility. As he personally 
investigated incidents between officials and bands, his views and perspective of 
Indian-government relations became more and more important. Reed maintained 
the view that the bands were generally content with their treatment by the depart-
ment, and that certain chiefs, namely Big Bear and Poundmaker, were stirring up 
dissent. He investigated a petition presented to Agent Macrae in the fall of 1884, 
which listed 18 items of complaint about the implementation of the treaties. Reed’s 
report dismissed all the complaints.34 He had in the past responded to complaints 
by  saying  that  they were based on  “false  statements being made by  them  [the 
chiefs] and constantly  repeated until  they become a matter of belief as no one 
was ever present capable of giving them a denial.”35 Reed based his opinion on 
his direct experiences with individual chiefs. During those meetings, he pressed 
chiefs to show how the treaties had not been fulfilled and explained away the basis 
of every complaint with examples of the Crown’s fulfilment of its obligations. 
Reed reported that Big Bear’s involvement in the petition was further proof of his 
role as a “troublemaker” in the district.36 As a sign of Reed’s growing influence on 
Indian policy, in a reply to Reed’s report from the Department of Indian Affairs, 
likely from Vankoughnet, the department stated that “it would appear from Mr. 
Reed’s report that the Indians have no good grounds for serious complaint in any 
respect.”37 The memorandum goes on to instruct all Indian agents to explain to the 
bands that the treaties were being fulfilled and that the federal government was 
giving them far more than what was stated in the treaties.
As they were seen as the most disruptive influences to the proper administration 
of Indian affairs in the Northwest, senior departmental officials wanted to remove 
these “troublesome” chiefs from their positions. Vankoughnet, in a February 1885 
letter, asked Dewdney for his opinion on how best to deal with Big Bear, Little 
Pine, and Poundmaker, calling them “Indians [who] incite or stir up other Indians 
... to act in a riotous, disorderly or threatening manner.”38 Vankoughnet suggested 
that such people should be used as examples to the general Aboriginal population 
through their arrest and imprisonment. Dewdney agreed whole-heartedly with his 
superior’s plan but noted that the territorial judicial system did not view the matter 
in the same way. Where the Department of Indian Affairs wanted convictions and 
imprisonment  of  chiefs  for  “disloyalty”  and  stirring  up  discontent,  the magis-
trates  and  the North West Mounted Police  only  arrested  and  convicted  people 
for specific crimes as listed in the Criminal Code.39 Dewdney went so far as to 
suggest the code itself be amended to make the prosecution of chiefs easier. No 
modification to the Criminal Code was ever made in this regard.
As Dewdney and Vankoughnet debated how to rid  themselves of  the chiefs, 
the North West Mounted  Police was  growing  increasingly  concerned with  the 
policies of the Department of Indian Affairs. Throughout 1884, police inspectors 
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and constables were reporting on the state of Indian affairs from a police perspec-
tive. In his report of the 1884 incident during Big Bear and Poundmaker’s council, 
Inspector W.W. Crozier  of  the Battleford detachment placed  the blame  for  the 
incident not on the chiefs, but rather on the department’s policies. He stated, “if the 
government wish to conduct Indian affairs peacefully, their policy should be, as 
it has been in the past, one of conciliation.” He roundly condemned Indian policy 
by questioning the very nature of the civilization program: “It does not seem to 
me reasonable to expect a lot of pure savages to settle down and become steady 
farmers all at once—or even within a few years—and even if they do not do much 
work for some time, it should not be considered extraordinary.”40 He continued by 
suggested that the refusal of the bands’ demands would lead to further confronta-
tion. He also warned that the bands were prepared to resist any attempts interfere 
with them, and that further confrontation would adversely affect the whole of the 
Territories. The inspector’s words had little impact upon the administration in the 
Northwest. Agents did not receive more discretionary powers to issue rations, the 
work for food policy was continued, and discontent among the bands continued 
to increase. Crozier’s warnings of possible future violence became reality in the 
spring of 1885.
Rebellion and the End of the Treaty Movement
On April 2, 1885, Big Bear’s attempts at negotiating new treaties with the federal 
government came to a quick and violent end. Shortly after the Métis victory at 
Duck Lake,  and while Big Bear was  absence  from his  camp,  several warriors 
from his band and the neighbouring Wood Cree band attacked the settlement of 
Frog Lake,  looting  the Hudson’s Bay Company  store  and  killing  nine  people, 
including  the  Indian  agent, Thomas Quinn;  the  farm  instructor,  John Delaney; 
and  two  Catholic  priests  (Morton  1979,  77).  Bolstered  by  additional  warriors 
from Bobtail’s Reserve and the Cold Lake Chipewyans, the bands moved down 
the  Saskatchewan  River  towards  Fort  Pitt,  where  they  met  Little  Poplar  and 
his  followers  from  Battleford,  who  had  been  waiting  before  the  fort  (Demp- 
sey 1984, 168). On April 14, 1885, Fort Pitt surrendered and then was pillaged by 
the Cree for war plunder. After receiving news that Poundmaker was under attack 
by soldiers and police, the camp was moved to Frenchman’s Butte. On May 28, 
1885, the Cree warriors ambushed the militia forces of General Strange, who was 
tracking the Cree from Fort Pitt (Beal and Macleod 1984, 284). During the battle, 
the Chipewyans deserted, prisoners escaped, and the Cree warriors began to fall 
back. Fleeing  towards Loon Lake,  the Cree were again attacked by  the militia 
on June 3, 1885. The Wood Cree left the group to take refuge in the forests and 
others headed towards Batoche, while a number of warriors held out until the end 
of June. Big Bear’s son, Imasees, avoiding patrols and the militia, led more than 
a hundred Cree south across the border to take refuge in the United States. On 
July 4, 1885, Big Bear, alone, abandoned by his band, surrendered to the militia 
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at Fort Carlton (Dempsey 1984, 180). Big Bear, Poundmaker, and nearly 45 other 
“rebel Indians” were put on trial, along with Louis Riel and other Métis arrested 
after the battle of Batoche (Dickason 2002, 311). Big Bear was sentenced to three 
years imprisonment, as was Poundmaker, although their sentences were reduced 
to  18 months  after  both  developed  serious  illnesses. Big Bear was  released  in 
early  1887,  and,  having  never  taken  a  reserve,  joined  his  daughter  on  Pound- 
maker’s reserve.
As  the events on  the North Saskatchewan unfolded, numerous chiefs across 
the region refused to participate in the uprising. The concerns of the North West 
Mounted Police and government officials, such as Reed and Dewdney, that the 
uprising would spread to all the bands in the Territories, proved to be unfounded. 
From the first instances of violence, several chiefs attempted to distance them-
selves from the bands in revolt and made overtures of peace to the Crown. Chiefs 
such as George Bear, Pasqua, and Piapot, all sent letters and telegrams to Ottawa 
stating their loyalty to the Crown. They all referred to the treaties as the source 
of their loyalty, as did a group of chiefs from the Wolf Creek region of Alberta: 
“At the Treaty, we were promised peace, not war, and we wish to remain loyal 
till  death.”41  Piapot,  once  considered  one  of  the more  “troublesome”  chiefs  in 
Treaty 4,  also  referred  to his promise of  loyalty by  stating,  “It  is  eleven years 
since I gave up fighting. When I took the Government Treaty, I touched the pen 
not to interfere with the white man and the white man not to interfere with me ... I 
promise you [Macdonald] as I have promised our Governor that I will never fight 
against the white man.”42 All the while promising their loyalty, the chiefs used the 
occasion of their communication to stress again for the fulfilment of the treaty 
promises. Chiefs Ochapascoopeeasis and Rock Chief both reminded the federal 
government that they remained loyal, even though all the treaty provisions had 
not been fulfilled.43 In his letter, Pasqua comments on the poor state of his band 
by  saying,  “We depend on promises by Governor Morris  to us because of our 
keeping faith, and hope when trouble is ended that she [the Queen] will extend 
some help to us on our reserves to make a better living than before.”44 Interest-
ingly, Prime Minister Macdonald responded directly to the telegrams and letters, 
stating that “the Government will do everything that they properly can to forward 
the interests and improve the conditions of the red man. All treaty promises will 
be faithfully carried out and loyalty of these chiefs is fully appreciated.”45 As it 
had been prior to the uprising, however, the treaty promises were “carried out” 
according to the federal government’s understanding of its obligations.
In the aftermath of the defeat of Riel and the Métis at the battle of Batoche, the 
Department of Indian Affairs attempted to ascertain why part of the Aboriginal 
population had rebelled. Again relying on reports by Hayter Reed, Lawrence Vank-
oughnet placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Riel, Poundmaker, and Big 
Bear, describing them as disloyal troublemakers who had always been opposed to 
Canada’s administration of the Northwest. Following the line of argument that had 
been presented prior to the events of the spring of 1885, Reed and Vankoughnet 
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saw Big Bear and Poundmaker as the leaders of the Indian rebellion, disregarding 
several eyewitness accounts  to  the contrary. As  leaders of disloyal bands,  they 
were to bear the brunt of the blame.46 As a result of their involvement, the rebel-
lious bands were considered  to have violated  the  treaties  they had  signed,  and 
their treaty rights were to be suspended until such time as the department saw fit 
to restore them. On Reed’s recommendation, the department instituted a series of 
punitive measures against any rebellious Indians, such as withholding annuities, a 
pass system, and breaking up bands.47 While Vankoughnet’s memorandum stated 
that loyal bands would not face any such restrictions, certain measures, especially 
the pass system, were applied to all bands in the Northwest.
One of the major consequences of the rebellion was a hardening of the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs’s position towards complaints. In the first years after the 
uprising, any chief that dared complain about missing treaty cattle or not having 
received  his  full  complement  of  implements  was  accused  of  disloyalty.  The 
department  continued  to  keep  a  close watch  on bands,  and  appointed  regional 
officials to tour reserves and report on the level of discontentment among the 
bands. An example of one such tour was the one made by the Anglican bishop of 
the Northwest Territories, J.A. MacKay, to the Battleford bands. While he found 
most  of  the  bands  fairly  complacent,  the  bishop  noted  that  some  bands  were 
disgruntled and that only the constant presence of troops in the area was prevent-
ing a repetition of the events of the previous year.48 
As the Department of Indian Affairs began to enforce its new restrictive policies, 
its general handling of the Aboriginal population in the Northwest and, specifi-
cally,  its  respect  of  the  treaties, was being questioned  in Ottawa. The member 
of Parliament  for Huron-West, Malcolm Cameron, presented a strong criticism 
of the department’s handling of the treaties and the rebellion. Using first-hand 
accounts from prominent figures in the Northwest Territories, such as Father 
Scollen, and the reports of the department itself, Cameron presented the case that 
the root causes of the rebellion were the non-fulfilment of the terms of the treaties 
and the refusal of the Department of Indian Affairs to acknowledge its mistakes. 
He went on to criticize every aspect of Indian administration, from the quality of 
the implements and cattle to the morality and character of Indian agents and the 
Indian commissioner. Cameron was adamant that the blame of the uprising had to 
rest with the department’s officials. 
The conduct of the officials of the North-West Territories, more than any thing else, 
created dissatisfaction and discontent among the Indians; I say that the misconduct and 
the mismanagement of the Administration in connection with the Indian Affairs in the 
North-West Territories,  as much  as  anything  else produced uneasiness,  dissatisfaction 
and discontent among the Indians, which ultimately broke out into open rebellion.49
Cameron also accused the federal government of breaking the promises made in 
the  treaties, what he called “solemn covenants entered  into with  the  Indians  ... 
shamefully, openly, persistently and systematically broken by this Government.”50 
He concluded  that “instead of dealing fairly and honestly by  the Indian, as we 
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ought to have done, instead of maintaining unbroken our treaty obligations with 
the Indian, we pursued, and we still pursue that mad and reckless and inhuman 
policy of submission by starvation.” 
The MP’s  remarks  in  the House  of  Commons were  a  surprisingly  accurate 
representation  of  the  arguments  being  made  by  Treaty  chiefs  in  the  10  years 
following the signing of the treaties. As usual, the Department of Indian Affairs 
responded to Cameron by outlining how the government had endeavoured to fulfil 
the treaties. In a 60-page document, the officials of the department, specifically 
Lawrence Vankoughnet,  refuted every  single claim made  in Cameron’s  speech 
to  the House of Commons. The departmental  report  refuted Cameron’s  claims 
on two fronts: first, by showing that it had implemented the treaties according to 
the letter of the text and more so; and second, that Treaty bands had not properly 
understood the nature of the federal government’s obligations under the treaties. 
In response to the claims that the bands had not receive all the implements and 
cattle they asked for, the report states that all that was entitled to by the treaties 
had been issued to the bands. The department added that the issue at hand was 
not what was promised in the treaty but, rather, what the chiefs demanded beyond 
the terms of the treaty (Department of Indian Affairs 1886, 37). The department 
stated that while it could have limited itself to the terms of the treaty, it had been in 
fact far more generous, reporting that the bands “certainly have received far more 
than they were entitled to under their treaties. Let it not be forgotten that with a 
single exception [Treaty 6] not one of the treaties stipulates that the Government 
shall supply the Indians with food” (5). The rationing of Aboriginal people was 
done “as a measure of humanity” and that food was issued so as to encourage the 
bands to become self-sustaining. The overarching policy goal of civilization was 
reinforced again, while refuting the claims of a starvation policy: “The provisions 
supplied them are so distributed as  to encourage industry. Men who absolutely 
refuse to work are certainly not encouraged in their idleness.”
The departmental report attributed the Treaty bands’ incomprehension of the 
federal government’s treaty obligations largely to their “primitive condition” and 
childish manner. The  report  stated  that  the Treaty  bands  “have  very  imperfect 
notions of the duties of the Government towards them, and of their claims upon 
the Government. They desire  to get all  they can; and  they are deeply  incensed 
when they think they have been wronged” (Department of Indian Affairs 1886, 
3). Moreover, the report accuses of Cameron of spreading the same “exaggerated 
notions of their rights” as had been claimed by leaders such as Big Bear, Piapot, 
and Poundmaker. The department stated that it was its responsibility to care for 
the bands while  they were  in  a  state of  “simplicity” and “ignorance.” Further-
more, it saw itself as the ultimate arbiter of what was required for their advance-
ment  and what was beyond  their  capabilities  (5). The department’s  rebuttal  of 
Cameron’s  allegations  brought  the matter  to  a  close. While  there  was  a  short 
debate in the Senate regarding Cameron’s presentation later that year, the issue of 
treaties and the fulfilment of treaty obligations never returned to the floor of the 
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House of Commons. The unmediated implementation of the Department of Indian 
Affairs’ policies and their effect on the lives of Aboriginal people in the Northwest 
remained largely unchallenged for the next 70 years. Over the course of that time, 
successive amendments to the Indian Act brought ever-tighter controls over the 
daily lives of Treaty bands.
In  the  past  130  years,  the  confrontational  positions  of  Treaty  First  Nations 
and  the  federal  government  have  remained  largely  unchanged,  although  the 
conflict was suppressed. First Nations still claim that the treaties have remained 
largely unfulfilled while the Crown’s position is that treaty obligations have been 
respected in accordance to the letter of the text. While Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada maintains a largely similar position to the one it held back in the late nine-
teenth century, the Treaty First Nations have modified their position. In the 1870s 
and 1880s, treaty leaders continuously remarked that the treaties they had signed 
were not sufficient to allow them to either continue their traditional way of life or 
to adapt to the new agricultural lifestyle being advocated by the department. This 
perception of the insufficiencies of the existing treaties led to a series of calls for 
a renegotiation of the treaties, and attempts to get better terms. 
Today, Treaty First Nations are looking for new agreements that would build 
upon  their  existing  treaties. While  the  replacement of  the  treaty was an aspect 
of  the earlier Yukon Umbrella Agreement and some comprehensive  land claim 
agreements in the Northwest Territories, more recent negotiations have stalled or 
broken off, such as the Akaitcho negotiations, because the agreements on the table 
did not reflect the earlier treaty. The same has happened in Saskatchewan with the 
long-standing self-government negotiations between Canada and the Federation 
of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. In this case, Grand Chief Alphonse Bird linked 
the rejection of the final agreement at the referendum level to the failure to see 
any clear references to the Numbered Treaties. As self-government and compre-
hensive land claim negotiations continue, the respect accorded to the Numbered 
Treaties and the need to reflect them in modern agreements are becoming central 
issues, aggravated by the continuing gap that exists between Crown and Treaty 
First Nations’ perceptions of the implementation of the treaties themselves.
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